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Abstract
A common adage runs that, given a theory manifesting symme-
tries, the syntax of that theory should be modified in order to con-
struct a new theory, from which symmetry-variant structure of the
original theory has been excised. Call this strategy for explicating
the underlying ontology of symmetry-related models reduction. Re-
cently, Dewar has proposed an alternative to reduction as a means of
articulating the ontology of symmetry-related models—what he calls
(external) sophistication, in which the semantics of the original theory
is modified, and symmetry-related models of that theory are treated
as if they are isomorphic. In this paper, we undertake a critical eval-
uation of sophistication about symmetries—we find the programme
underdeveloped in a number of regards. In addition, we clarify the
interplay between sophistication about symmetries, and a separate
debate to which Dewar has contributed—viz., that between interpre-
tational versus motivational approaches to symmetry transformations.
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1 Introduction
The venerable literature on symmetry transformations is brimming
with new distinctions.1 On the one hand is the question of whether
symmetry-related models of a given theory should invariably be re-
garded as being physically equivalent, or whether the situation is more
subtle. Advocates of the former view include e.g. Saunders [56]; for a
response to this view, drawing upon the physics literature in order to
advocate caution, see e.g. Belot’s [6]. This former view was dubbed in
[41] the interpretational approach to symmetries, as contrasted with
a more modest motivational approach to symmetries, according to
which symmetry-related models at most motivate one to construct a
metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the common ontology
of symmetry-related models, but only once that characterisation is
procured should those models be regarded as being physically equiv-
alent.
1See [8] for a recent survey of this literature, and [7] for an older—though still
exceptional—collection.
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A second distinction which has arisen in recent times in the lit-
erature on symmetry transformations regards the correct way to pro-
ceed in explicating the common ontology of symmetry-related models.
(Note that this question is distinct from the above normative ques-
tion regarding whether symmetry-related models may be regarded
ab initio as being physically equivalent.) A common strategy (see
e.g. [11, 19, 44]) states that, in order to so explicate the ontology
underlying symmetry-related models, one should construct a new the-
ory, trading only in the structures which are invariant across those
symmetry-related models. Call this strategy reduction; this invari-
ably involves modifying the syntax (i.e. the equations) of the original
theory manifesting the symmetry under consideration. Recently, how-
ever, Dewar [18] has proposed two alternatives to reductionism, which
he dubs internal sophistication and external sophistication about sym-
metries. The former again involves mathematical reformulation,2 this
time not of the syntax but of the semantics (i.e., the models), in such
a way that allows for the ‘forgetting’ of certain structures in the mod-
els of the original theory (what is meant by this will be made precise
below).3 On the latter approach, by contrast, the semantics is modi-
fied without having first provided a mathematical reformulation: it is
simply declared that symmetry-related models are treated as if they
are isomorphic. Dewar claims in [18] that external sophistication is
not only easier to implement than reduction, but is also more general,
in the sense that it is an interpretative strategy which is invariably
available.4
In this paper, we undertake a critical evaluation of the sophistica-
tionist strategy for articulating the ontology associated with symmetry-
2Except for trivial cases in which the symmetry-related models are already isomorphic
and one can immediately ‘forget’ certain structures—see §2.4.
3Dewar’s way of articulating the syntax/semantics distinction does not coincide with
another way of drawing that distinction: namely, syntax as the mathematics of one’s
theory (encompassing both syntax and semantics in Dewar’s sense), and semantics as the
interpretation of one’s theory—i.e., the establishment of a mapping between the models
of one’s theory and possible worlds/physical situations. It is important to be clear on this
difference, in order to avoid confusions going forward.
4For other works engaging with distinctions very close to that between reduction and
sophistication, see [51, 57]. Both Rickles [51, ch. 8] and Dewar [18, p. 514] highlight that,
since symmetry reduction offers a path towards quantisation, it would be an interesting
and worthy task to investigate the interactions between sophistication and quantisation;
that task will have to wait for another day. For further discussion on symmetries and
quantisation, see [4, 25].
3
related models; we find in general this approach to be under-developed
in a number of crucial respects. Moreover, while Dewar claims that
sophisticated theories preserve the explanatory virtues of the original
theories from which they are constructed, we argue that this claim is
not invariably true. In addition, we seek to provide insight into the
interplay between one’s position in the interpretational/motivational
debate and one’s commitments in the reduction/sophistication debate.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In §2, we provide some
essential background on the above-mentioned two debates in the phi-
losophy of symmetries. In §3, we present the views of two notable
figures who have contributed to these debates—namely, Dewar (see
e.g. [16, 17, 18]) and Møller-Nielsen (see e.g. [40, 41, 50, 49])—; doing
so will enable us to make clearer how the interpretation/motivation
debate overlaps with the reduction/sophistication debate. In §4, we
present three classes of criticism of sophistication about symmetries
(as a justification of the interpretational approach). We conclude in
§5.
2 Background
In this section, we present some essential groundwork on symmetry
transformations in scientific theories. To be specific, in §2.1, we re-
call the ‘semantic approach’ to scientific theories—which will be the
framework largely adopted in this paper. In §2.2, we present (fol-
lowing Dasgupta [14]) three approaches to the definition of symme-
try transformations, and highlight the essential feature of symmetry
transformations which will be relevant for our purposes in this paper.
In §2.3, we recall the debate between ‘interpretational’ versus ‘moti-
vational’ approaches to symmetry transformations, which regards the
normative import of symmetries. Finally, in §2.4, we introduce the
distinction which constitutes the focus of this paper—namely, that
between ‘sophistication’ versus ‘reduction’ about symmetries. As we
will see, this debate regards the best way to proceed in the construc-
tion and interpretation of one’s physical theories, once one is presented
with a theory manifesting certain symmetries.
4
2.1 Models
On the ‘semantic conception’ of scientific theories, a theory is associ-
ated with a class of models. For a given theory T , we take the most
general class of associated models to be that of ‘kinematically possible
models’ (KPMs) K, which consists of tuples of specified geometrical
objects.5 Given a class K of KPMs for T , one then restricts to the
class of so-called ‘dynamically possible models’ (DPMs) D ⊂ K of
T , by specifying certain dynamical equations which the geometrical
objects in question must satisfy.
Let us illustrate this setup with an example. The KPMs of Newto-
nian gravitation theory (NGT) set in Newtonian spacetime are picked
out by all tuples of the form 〈M, tab, hab,∇, σa, ϕ, ρ, ξa〉, whereM is (as
above) a four-dimensional differentiable manifold; tab and h
ab are fixed
fields with respective signatures diag (1, 0, 0, 0) and diag (0, 1, 1, 1) and
orthogonal in the sense that tabh
bc = 0; ∇ is compatible with tab and
hab; σa is a fixed timelike (in the sense that tabσ
b 6= 0) and covari-
antly constant vector field representing the persisting points of abso-
lute space; ϕ and ρ are real scalar fields on M representing, respec-
tively, the gravitational potential and matter density field; and ξa is a
timelike vector field, integral curves of which represent the motions of
test particles.6 Given the KPMs of NGT, the DPMs of this theory are
5Here, we understand ‘geometrical object’ in the sense of [2]; for an alternative under-
standing of the meaning of this term, see [38].
6For further details on the mathematical structure of the KPMs of NGT, see [31, 47].
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picked out as those tuples 〈M, tab, hab,∇, σa, ϕ, ρ, ξa〉 which satisfy7
Rabcd = 0, (2)
hab∇a∇bϕ = 4piρ, (3)
−∇aϕ = ξb∇bξa. (4)
Here, (2) imposes flatness of ∇; (3) is the Newton-Poisson equation,
and (4) is Newton’s force law in this context, where ξa represents the
four-velocity of the test particle under consideration.
Models of a theory T may be interpreted as representing possible
worlds. Sometimes, however, we may wish to interpret two or more
distinct models as representing the same world. In that case, the space
of KPMs K of T is partitioned into equivalence classes of such models.
In the case in which the interpretation of T leads to such a redundancy,
we may attempt to construct a reduced space of models D˜ of some
new theory T˜ , in which equivalent models of T are ‘mathematically
identified’—in the sense that a formal mapping is established between
the equivalence classes of DPMs of T and unique DPMs of T˜ . We will
see concrete examples of these manoeuvres in the ensuing sections of
this paper.
2.2 Symmetry transformations
There is a rich philosophical literature on the definition of symme-
try transformations in physics. A useful tripartite distinction between
formal, ontic, and epistemic approaches to symmetry transformations
is drawn by Dasgupta in [14, §5]. According to formal definitions of
symmetries, a symmetry is an automorphism of the space of DPMs
7An anonymous referee has objected that this presentation of NGT is ill-formed, in the
sense that ρ does not obey its own dynamical equations. To this, we would reply that one
should distinguish (i) an object in a theory satisfying its own dynamical equations, from
(ii) an object in a theory being permitted to vary from model to model. (ii) may hold of
a given object (e.g. ρ) without (i).
Even if one does wish to afford ρ its own dynamics, though, there are many moves that
one could make. For example, one could take the theory to be a theory of dust, in which
case ξa would be added to the theory’s defining tuple as the velocity field of the dust and
the system of equations would be supplemented by a conservation law,
∇a (ξaρ) = 0. (1)
We are grateful to the anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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of the theory in question, preserving some specified formal property.
One trivial example of a formal definition of a symmetry—presented
in [14, §5.2] and critiqued compellingly in [5, p. 6]—is that a symmetry
is any transformation which preserves the dynamical equations of the
theory in question. (Formal definitions of symmetries face a natural
charge of physical irrelevance; for further discussion, see [14, 50].) Ac-
cording to ontic definitions of symmetries, a symmetry transformation
is an automorphism of the space of DPMs of a given theory, preserv-
ing some specified class of putative physical quantities. (Examples of
ontic definitions of symmetries include e.g. Lagrangian symmetries,
generalised Noether symmetries, etc.—see [5].8) Finally, according to
epistemic definitions of symmetries, a symmetry transformation is an
automorphism of the space of DPMs of a given theory, such that any
two models related by that mapping are empircially equivalent. (In
this sense, symmetry-related models of necessity agree on ‘empirical
substructures’—see [60, p. 64].)
Note that it may or may not be the case that models of a given the-
ory related by formal or ontic symmetries are empirically equivalent.
However, for the purposes of this paper—and as will be explained in
detail in the following sections—the symmetry transformations of in-
terest are precisely those which (whether by definition or otherwise)
are regarded as relating empirically equivalent models. Thus, we make
this restriction in the remainder of this paper, while remaining offi-
cially neutral on the most appropriate definition of a symmetry trans-
formation (for more on this latter topic, see [50]).9
2.3 Interpretation and motivation
The above is purely formal; there remains an outstanding question
concerning when two models of T should be interpreted as representing
the same possible world. One popular line is what was dubbed in [41,
§2] the interpretational approach to symmetry transformations: two
symmetry-related models of T typically may be regarded ab initio as
representing the same possible world, even in the absence of a co-
herent explication of their common ontology.10 (For an extensive list
8One would be right to question whether the distinction between ontic and formal
definitions of symmetries is clear-cut—cf. [50, §2.2].
9In making this point, we echo [28].
10This ‘coherent explication’ is what Møller-Nielsen calls in [41] a ‘metaphysically per-
spicuous characterisation’ of the common ontology of symmetry-related models. Though
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of citations of authors embracing this line, see [49, §3.1].) This is
in contrast with the motivational approach to symmetry transforma-
tions [41, p. 4], according to which the existence of symmetry-related
models at most motivates us to provide an explication of the shared
ontology of these symmetry-related models, but only once such an
explication is provided is it legitimate to regard those models as rep-
resenting the same possible world. (For detailed discussion of the
interpretation/motivation distinction, see [41, 49, 50].)
It is worth highlighting that there exist two different strands of
interpretationalism—the issue here regards the ‘typically’ clause in
the above formulation of the position. On the stronger version of the
interpretational approach, this clause is redundant: symmetry-related
models may invariably be regarded ab initio as being physically equiv-
alent. On the weaker version of the interpretational approach, by
contrast, this ‘typically’ clause is not redundant, and invites a cer-
tain hedging: advocates of this weaker version of the view may argue
that, in virtue of certain e.g. theoretical/metaphysical/super-empirical
considerations, symmetry-related models should not invariably be re-
garded ab initio as being physically equivalent—for it may be that
in certain cases, one has strong independent reasons to continue to
regard these models as being distinct.11 We will see in §3.1 and §4.2
that Dewar should be understood as falling into the latter of these two
camps.
Once this distinction is noted, one may also carry it across to
the motivational approach to symmetries. Specifically, on the weaker
version of the motivational approach, symmetry-related models may
only be regarded as being physically equivalent once we have to hand
a coherent metaphysical picture of the common ontology underpin-
ning their equivalence—but once we are in possession of that picture,
other e.g. explanatory/metaphysical factors should not bear upon our
regarding those models as being physically equivalent. By contrast, on
we discuss this notion below, here is one example of such a characterisation: Galilean
spacetime (in which the vector field σa of Newtonian spacetime is excised) affords the
metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the common ontology underlying models
of NGT set in Newtonian spacetime related by kinematic shifts (which are defined with
respect to the σa field). (Cf. e.g. [21, ch. 3].)
11Suppose, for example, that one’s metaphysics is built around the notion of unde-
tectable absolute velocity—then, even an interpretationalist may wish to resist regarding
models of Newtonian gravitation theory set in Newtonian spacetime as being physically
equivalent.
8
the stronger version of the motivational approach, symmetry-related
models may only be regarded as being physically equivalent once we
have to hand a coherent metaphysical picture of the common on-
tology underpinning their equivalence—and, moreover, even once we
are in possession of such a picture, it may be that certain explana-
tory/metaphysical considerations preclude us from regarding those
models as being physically equivalent.
Where do specific authors stand with respect to these distinctions?
Very briefly, we take Saunders [56] to subscribe to strong interpreta-
tionalism; Dewar [16, 18] to weak interpretationalism (see §3.1 and
§4.2); Møller-Nielsen [41, 49] to weak motivationalism;12 and Martens
[35] to strong motivationalism. While these points are important,
however, it is worth re-emphasising the central difference between the
interpretational and motivational approaches. Interpretationalists of
all stripes maintain that one’s regarding symmetry-related models of
a given theory as being physically equivalent need not wait upon an
explication of the common ontology thought to underpin that physical
equivalence. It is this point which, crucially, separates the interpreta-
tionalist from the motivationalist.
2.4 Reduction and sophistication
The central focus of this paper falls upon what Dewar dubs a distinc-
tion between reduction versus sophistication about symmetry trans-
formations. Here is how he puts the matter:
It is often claimed that the symmetries of a theory reveal
“surplus structure”: structure which, in some sense, the
theory could do without. For example, the boost symme-
try of Newtonian mechanics indicates the superfluousness
of absolute velocities; the gauge symmetry of electromag-
netism reveals the superfluousness of absolute potentials;
and so on and so forth. Moreover, it is widely held that
if this is the case, then some modification of one’s the-
ory is appropriate, so as to make explicit what structure is
12More precisely, Møller-Nielsen’s formulation of his preferred motivational approach
equivocates between the weak and the strong version. Martens has argued that Møller-
Nielsen’s analysis of electromagnetism indicates that what he has in mind is the weak
version [35]. In fact, according to Martens, this case study is one of the main reasons that
one should favour the strong version instead.
9
not surplus (e.g. the replacement of Newtonian by Galilean
spacetime, in response to the boost symmetry of Newtonian
mechanics). ... I compare and contrast two ways of mak-
ing such a modification. The first is to replace the theory
by (what I shall call) a reduced theory: a theory that deals
only in quantities which are invariant under the relevant
symmetry. The second is to replace the theory by (what I
shall call) a sophisticated theory: a theory in which models
related by a symmetry are isomorphic. [18, pp. 485-486]
Reductionism—i.e., the advocation of the construction of such a
‘reduced’ theory when confronted with symmetry-related models of
one’s original theory in order to explicate the common ontology of
those models—is certainly a widespread view in the literature—for
presentations of such a view, see e.g. [10, 11, 15].13 In more detail,
the idea [of reductionism] is that we (i) identify some col-
lection of invariants of the original theory; (ii) specify a
theory in terms of those invariants; and (iii) show that the
new theory captures all the symmetry-invariant content of
the old theory. [18, pp. 492-493]
To put the matter differently, we take reductionism to consist in
the following. Take the space of solutions D of the theory under con-
sideration, and consider all classes of symmetry-related models in D
(where, as always, we restrict to the relevant class of symmetry-related
models which are empirically equivalent—cf. §2.2). Then, construct
the space of DPMs D˜ of some new theory,14 such that the classes of
symmetry-related models in D are mapped to a unique element of D˜,
which contains the ‘common mathematical structure’ of the original
class of elements of D. This fulfills what Dewar calls the mandate to
“specify a theory in terms of [the] invariants” of the original theory;
articulating the mapping between the classes of symmetry-related el-
ements of D and the unique elements of D˜ suffices to “show that the
new theory captures all the symmetry-invariant content of the old
theory.” Reductionism, then, involves a certain kind of mathematical
13We take the call of De Haro and Butterfield to find a ‘common core’ in the presence
of symmetry-related models, or duality-related theories, to manifest the reductionist view.
(We do not discuss further ‘dualities’ in this paper; for recent work on this topic, see
e.g. [10, 15, 39, 45, 48, 52].)
14Clearly, this will involve first constructing a space of KPMs K˜ for that new theory.
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identification in the sense of §2.1—namely, mathematical identifica-
tion in which the ‘reduced’ theory traffics only in “invariants of the
original theory.”
The alternative to reductionism is what Dewar calls sophistication
about symmetries. Here,
the idea is that we need not insist on finding a theory whose
models are invariant under the application of the symmetry
transformation [as in the case of reductionism], but can rest
content with a theory whose models are isomorphic under
that transformation. That is, if M and N are symmetry-
related models of the unreduced theory, then they give rise
to the same model of the reduced theory ... ; the proposal
is that we instead look for a theory such that M and N
give rise to distinct but isomorphic models. [18, p. 498]
If one actually constructs a new theory, in which “M and N give
rise to distinct but isomorphic models”, and which is related to the
original theory by some ‘forgetful’ map (see [18, p. 502] for details, and
e.g. [63] for further discussion), then one has (in Dewar’s terminology)
internally sophisticated one’s theory.
At [18, p. 502], Dewar offers the following remark: the difference be-
tween reduction and sophistication is, essentially, that while the former
position advocates altering the syntax (i.e. equations) of the theory un-
der consideration in the presence of symmetry-related models in order
to articulate the common content of those models, the latter position
advocates altering the semantics (i.e. models) of that theory, such
that “the pictures on the new semantics are simply what we obtain by
taking the old objects, and declaring, by fiat, that the symmetry trans-
formations are now going to “count” as isomorphisms”. While this is
certainly true in the case of external sophistication (on which more be-
low), it is worth registering that (just as in the case of reduction) this
claim is not entirely true in the case of internal sophistication—for here
one is to reformulate the original theory (i.e., modify the semantics of
the original theory) such that the interpretation now proceeds in terms
of the ‘na¨ıve’ interpretation of the models of the new theory—where
that new theory was constructed by modifying the semantics (i.e., the
models) of the original theory in a way that enables the possibility of
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‘forgetting’ structure.15,16
To get clearer on what external sophistication is supposed to be, it
will first be useful to distinguish it from what one might call traditional
sophistication. Of sophistication in general, Dewar states explicitly
that
the proposal on the table—that we can do justice to a sym-
metry using isomorphism rather than invariance—is a gen-
eralisation of the “sophisticated substantivalist” method for
dealing with spacetime symmetries. [18, p. 501]
Recall that ‘sophisticated substantivalism’ affords a means of regard-
ing hole-diffeomorphic models of general relativity (GR),17 or statically-
shifted models of NGT, as being physically equivalent—it does so
by rejecting the view that spacetime points have primitive identities
which persist across possibilities. (See [46, 47] for details.) Dewar bor-
rows the term ‘sophistication’ from these debates, but admits that the
notion of sophistication has been loosened substantially in his hands,
as the original concept is associated with an attitude only towards
symmetry-related models that are already isomorphic. Specifically,
sophisticated substantivalism is a metaphysical thesis, regarding how
to interpret the ontology of isomorphic symmetry-related models.18 It
is this view which we call traditional sophistication.
Dewar’s external sophistication, on the other hand, is the state-
ment that symmetry-related models should be regarded as being iso-
morphic, with (in general) no (explicit) accompanying metaphysical
package.19 This is the attitude which Dewar advocates in cases in
15The examples presented in [63] provide a clear illustration of the differences between
reduction and internal sophistication. For instance, in the case of electromagnetism for-
mulated in terms of the vector potential Aa, the reduced version of this theory (where the
reduction proceeds with respect to the U (1) gauge symmetry of the theory) is electromag-
netism formulated in terms of the Faraday tensor Fab, while the internally sophisticated
version of the theory is the fibre bundle formulation of electromagnetism. More on this in
§4.
16Dewar’s, in this sense, ‘putting dynamics before kinematics’, invites comparisons with
Brown’s dynamical approach to physical theories [9]. Though interesting, we defer these
comparisons to future work.
17For background on the hole argument, see e.g. [43].
18For a generalisation of sophisticated substantivalism to the non-spatiotemporal case,
see Esfeld and Lam’s ‘moderate structuralism’ [22], and our discussion below.
19That said, it is worth flagging that Dewar takes it that his view does have metaphysical
content—this will be discussed in depth below.
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which the symmetry-related models under consideration are not iso-
morphic. In this case, the procedure is more complicated, for (i) the
models under consideration must be interpreted ‘as if’ they were iso-
morphic (which is now non-trivial, since they actually are not); and
(ii), the traditional sophisticationist methodology must be applied in
order to regard those models—interpreted as being isomorphic—as in
fact representing the same physical states of affairs. We will see in §4
that the absence of a suitably robust metaphysical package accompa-
nying (i) constitutes our central concern with external sophistication:
we fail to understand how the above ‘as if’ can do the metaphysical
work required of it.
At this point, it might be helpful to present two alternative plans
which sophisticationists seem to seek to adopt. The first, for internal
sophisticationists, runs as follows:
1. Semantically reformulate: Identify an alternative mathematical
formalism for the theory in question by modifying the semantics
(nota bene: not the syntax, or this would be a reduced formal-
ism) such that the models corresponding to symmetry-related
models in the original theory are isomorphic.
2. Traditionally sophisticate: Apply the sophisticated substantival-
ist methodolody (or some suitable analogue—see below) in order
to regard these isomorphic models of the new formalism as rep-
resenting the same physical state of affairs.
The second plan, this time for external sophisticationists, is the fol-
lowing:
1. Declare isomorphic: Declare that the symmetry-related models
under consideration are to be treated ‘as if’ they are isomorphic.
2. Traditionally sophisticate: Apply the sophisticated substantival-
ist methodolody (or some suitable analogue—see below) in order
to regard these isomorphic models of the new formalism as rep-
resenting the same physical state of affairs.
Here, external sophisticationism can be understood as explicitly skip-
ping the task of semantic reformulation, undertaken by the internal
sophisticationist: the ontology of symmetry-related models can be ar-
ticulated by treating them ‘as if’ they are isomorphic, then (at least
implicitly) recoursing to traditional sophistication. By contrast, in-
ternal sophisticationism wishes to realise the sophisticationist strat-
egy by explicitly constructing the appropriately mathematically refor-
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mulated theory in terms of which the ontology of the models of the
original theory is to be understood—except for trivial cases in which
the symmetry-related models are already isomorphic and one can im-
mediately traditionally sophisticate. It is thus important to note that
internal sophistication is understood as an alternative to, rather than
a special case of, external sophistication. (This will be especially rel-
evant in §4.1, where we argue that several of Dewar’s examples of
sophistication, being examples of internal or even merely traditional
sophistication, do therefore not support the universal applicability of
external sophistication.)
In sum, then, our taxonomy of ‘strains of sophistication’ is the
following:
Traditional sophistication: The decision to be anti-haecceitist or anti-
quidditist (as appropriate—see below) about a theory in which
symmetry-related models are already isomorphic.
Internal sophistication: The view that if symmetry-related models
are not isomorphic, then one should seek an explicit seman-
tic mathematical reformulation which renders them isomorphic,
and then interpret those models in an anti-haecceitistic/anti-
quidditistic fashion.
External sophistication: The view that if symmetry-related mod-
els are not isomorphic, one can simply declare them isomorphic
(without seeking an explicit reformulation), and then apply the
appropriate anti-haecceitist or anti-quidditist interpretation.
To close this subsection, it is worth noting that Dewar’s external
sophistication is very much akin to a view which Sider calls quotienting
[57, ch. 5]—indeed, in this paper we take these to be the very same
view.20 As Sider puts it, this is the view
according to which, roughly, we can say that theories are
equivalent without saying why they are equivalent in terms
of fundamentality and underlying third theories.21 [57,
p. 152]
20Clearly, nomenclature here is not optimal, for one might take it that ‘to quotient’
is synonymous with ‘to reduce’. The reader is cautioned not to conflate reduction and
quotienting—for the latter is the same as (external) sophistication!
21Compare this with the following quote from an earlier paper by Dewar, which presages
the external sophisticationist position:
A more interesting thought, then, would be to ask whether there is some way in
which we could be anti-realist about part of a model without being required to
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Sider continues that, according to the quotienting perspective,
[t]here may be no way to say what is “really” going on;
maybe every good model has artifacts. It’s ok to just
say: this model does a good job of representing the phe-
nomenon, but certain features of the model are artifacts.
Moreover, for any model, we can say which features of the
model are genuinely representational and which are arti-
facts. There is no need to provide some privileged, artifact-
free description from which we can recover this information.
[57, p. 153]
With this view on the table, we will shortly turn to a critical
appraisal of external sophistication—we will end up agreeing with
Sider that this is not a viable approach to articulating the ontology
of symmetry-related models. Before doing so, however, we must get
clear on how Dewar’s views on all of the above distinctions interplay
with one another; it will also be informative to consider the positions
of certain other relevant authors on these matters.
3 Notable positions
In this section, we present and discuss the views of Dewar (§3.1) and
Møller-Nielsen (§3.2) on the interplay between the debates on inter-
pretation/motivation and on reduction/sophistication.
3.1 Dewar’s views
Dewar is an avowed interpretationalist about symmetries—this is ev-
ident when he writes at [16, p. 317] that
It is the contention of this paper that models related by
a symmetry transformation are merely different ways of
representing the same physical state of affairs ...
explicitly single out the parts of the model one is anti-realist about. I think the
answer is yes. The trick is to stipulate which models are synonymous, rather
than specifying which bits of a model one reads literally or not: we express our
qualified-realist attitude by affirming certain non-isomorphic models as synony-
mous, which commits us to denying that the respects in which such models
disagree correspond to any physically significant difference. [16, p. 322]
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The same thought is evident from the very first line of his D.Phil. thesis
[17, p. 3]:22
This thesis examines the idea that when a physical theory
contains symmetries, the theory should be interpreted in
such a way that symmetry-related models represent the
same physical state of affairs.23
How does Dewar think that a defence of the interpretational ap-
proach is supposed to go? Prima facie, such a view faces the obvious
difficulties: (Cf. [41, 49].)
1. How are we to identify the common structure associated with
symmetry-related models—and have we any reason to think that
such structure is always there to be found?
2. Even supposing that such structure can be found, does it invari-
ably admit of a coherent physical interpretation?
3. Even if such an interpretation is available, does it satisfy all
super-empirical criteria that one may consider relevant?24
22Compare this to the following quote by Dewar:
In this article, I will suppose that, at least under certain circumstances and
for certain theories, the following claim is true:
For a theory containing symmetries, we should not interpret that
theory in such a way that the symmetry-related models (that is,
models related by a map induced by a symmetry) represent distinct
ways for the world to be. [18, p. 491]
These restrictions to certain circumstances and theories, which are not further specified
by Dewar, may seem inconsistent with the universal scope of both quotes in the main
text, unless the restrictions only concern super-empirical criteria (i.e. weak interpreta-
tionalism). Further restrictions would give the game away to motivationalism, since the
main point of contention between interpretationalism and motivationalism (bracketing the
super-empirical considerations, §2.3) is exactly universalism, i.e. whether one can say for
all symmetries that symmetry-related models represent the same possible state of affairs
(interpretationalism) or merely for some symmetries—namely those for which one has ex-
plicitly provided a certain mathematical reformulation (motivationalism). We will thus
assume that the restrictions concern at most super-empirical criteria.
23One might reasonably note that Dewar says ‘examines’, rather than ‘endorses’. That
the latter is true is, however, unequivocal for the reader of the piece.
24As will become clear below, while we recognise internal sophistication, like reduction,
as being a legitimate means of articulating the common ontology of symmetry-related
models, this approach also faces difficulties (1)-(3).
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In fact, Dewar is aware of and sympathetic to these issues. For
instance, on (1) and (2), he writes at [18, p. 495] that
it is highly non-trivial to find such a reduced theory—or
even to demonstrate with confidence that such a theory
could exist.
On (3), Dewar acknowledges at [18, p. 496] that
even if such a theory can be found, that theory may seem
to have explanatory deficits relative to the original theory.
In light of these problems, Dewar asks, “Is there some other way of
taking on board the above interpretational principle [viz., the interpre-
tational approach to symmetries], without seeking out a reduced the-
ory?” [18, p. 498]. It is at this juncture that sophistication enters the
picture. The thought is that (external) sophistication itself typically
affords a coherent explication of the ontology of the symmetry-related
models under consideration—thereby justifying the interpretational
approach. Call this universal external sophistication.
Once again, the ‘typically’ qualifier may be read either in a strong
sense—‘invariably’—or in a weak sense, if one allows that extra-empirical
considerations may block the sophistication (§2.3). Note that Dewar’s
speaking of ‘explanatory deficits’ in response to (3), as well as his
discussion of several case studies, some of which we will revisit in
§4.2, seem to place him in the camp of the weaker strand of interpre-
tationalism. On the other hand, he also believes that the tentative
explanatory powers of an unreduced, unsophisticated theory are often
ultimately dispensable [16] and seems to claim—intending to improve
upon reductionism—that (external) sophistication will invariably pre-
serve explanations that are indispensable [18] (more on this in §4.2).
This would render the difference between the weak and strong forms
of the interpretational approach moot, at least in practice. The weak
form effectively becomes the strong form, at least with respect to
explanatory considerations, as it will never in fact occur that these
considerations block sophistication.
It is precisely the promise of universal external sophisticational-
ism in support of (weak) interpretationalism that we call into ques-
tion in §4 of this paper. We contend that external sophistication
in itself does not afford a perspicuous explication of the ontology of
symmetry-related models (§4.3). One can sometimes obtain such a
perspicuous explication, but only when sophistication is accompanied
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by mathematical reformulation and appropriate interpretation of that
new formalism (this, to repeat, being what Dewar calls ‘internal so-
phistication’). Since it is however not clear, a priori, whether such a
reformulation can invariably be found, one has to explicitly provide
one for each symmetry in each theory. But this is just to combine
(internal) sophisticationism with motivationalism about symmetries,
not with interpretationalism (i.e. option (e) in §3.2 instead of option
(c)) (§4.1). We will moreover question the claim that sophistication
will invariably preserve explanations (§4.2).
3.2 Møller-Nielsen’s views
It is illuminating to contrast the views of Dewar on the debates be-
tween interpretational and motivational approaches to symmetries,
and between sophisticationism and reductionism about symmetries,
with those of another author who has written on these matters—
namely, Møller-Nielsen [40, 41, 49, 50]. While Møller-Nielsen explicitly
favours the motivational approach to symmetries (indeed, the princi-
pal aim of [41, 50] is to defend this approach), what is more interesting
is that, depending upon the case in question, he favours reduction over
sophistication, or vice versa, as a means of providing a perspicuous
characterisation of the ontology of symmetry-related models.
Before spelling this out in detail, it will be useful to clarify a related
issue which has arisen in the recent literature: the appropriate notion
of ‘isomorphism’. To this end, consider a model of NGT set in New-
tonian spacetime, M = 〈M, ta, hab,∇, σa, ϕ, ρ, ξa〉, and the following
further two models of this theory:
1. A statically-shifted modelMstat = 〈M, ta, hab,∇, σa, α∗ϕ, α∗ρ, α∗ξa〉,
where α implements a static shift (i.e., time-independent trans-
lation) of the material content of the universe.
2. A kinematically-shifted modelMkin = 〈M, ta, hab,∇, σa, β∗ϕ, β∗ρ, β∗ξa〉,
where β implements a kinematic shift (i.e., linearly time-dependent
transformation) of the material content of the universe.
At [41, p. 1260], it is stated by Møller-Nielsen that M and Mstat
are isomorphic, for “they represent worlds that differ at most with
regard to which particular objects are playing which qualitative roles
(i.e., they represent at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds)”
(Cf. [47, p. 70] and [48, p. 221]). It should be clear, on reflection, that
this is not an appropriate definition of ‘isomorphism’, for it involves
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interpretation—but isomorphism should be a formal, mathematical
notion.
To make clear the relations between these two notions of isomor-
phism (i.e., the above interpretative notion on the one hand, and the
formal, mathematical notion on the other), in the context of space-
time theories, consider, following [64], certain maps which one could
define between elements of the solution space of NGT. In particular,
consider the following two maps:
• 1M : M → M , which is the identity map on M . This is the
unique map such that, given any other map γ : M →M , γ◦1M =
1M ◦ γ = γ.
• ψ : M → M , which is a diffeomorphism (i.e., a smooth map
with smooth inverse) taking all geometrical objects O on M to
the pushforward geometrical object, ψ∗O.
Now, as Weatherall stresses, “according to the theory of smooth
manifolds, diffeomorphism is the standard of isomorphism for mani-
folds; just as other mathematical objects are only defined up to isomor-
phism, manifolds are only defined up to diffeomorphism” [64, p. 335].
In the case of the static shift, M and Mstat are not identical mathe-
matical objects, for they are are not related by 1M ; however, they are
isomorphic as manifolds, for α implements a symmetry of Newtonian
spacetime, i.e., 〈M, ta, hab,∇, σa〉 = 〈M,α∗ta, α∗hab, α∗∇, α∗σa〉, in
which case one may writeMstat = 〈M,α∗ta, α∗hab, α∗∇, α∗σa, α∗ϕ, α∗ρ, α∗ξa〉,
illustrating thatM andMstat are related by a diffeomorphism α. By
contrast, in the case of the kinematic shift, M and Mkin are (again)
not identical mathematical objects, for they are are not related by 1M ;
moreover, they are are also not isomorphic as manifolds, for β does
not implement a symmetry of Newtonian spacetime, for σa 6= β∗σa,
meaning that M and Mkin are not related by a diffeomorphism β.
All of this amounts to the following. While the ‘interpretative’ def-
inition of isomorphism (favoured by Møller-Nielsen) issues the right
verdict on the static and kinematic shifts, it does so for the wrong
reasons: it is (in our view) preferable to use the mathematical defini-
tion of isomorphism, and only then invoke interpretative notions. In
the above case: having witnessed that models of NGT related by a
static shift are isomorphic (in the mathematical sense), whereas mod-
els related by a kinematic shift are not, one can then maintain (as
is, by now, standard in the literature) that, in order to undercut the
possibility of a static shift, isomorphic models should be interpreted
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anti-haecceitistically (and no mathematical reformulation is necessary
in order to do this—see [41, p. 1260] and [47, p. 229]); by contrast, in
order to undercut the possibility of a kinematic shift, mathematical
reformulation is necessary, in order to interpret those models as corre-
sponding to isomorphic models of some new theory, and then invoke
anti-haecceitism or anti-quidditism.
With the above clarifications in hand, let us return to considering
Møller-Nielsen’s views in the two debates under consideration. When
symmetry-related models are not isomorphic (in his sense—but note
that this is extensionally equivalent to the mathematical notion of
isomorphism in the cases under consideration here), as for e.g.M and
Mkin, Møller-Nielsen favours reduction as a route towards explicating
the common ontology of those symmetry-related models: the thought
is that only by constructing such reduced models and then interpreting
them can such an explication be procured (we concur with this verdict,
modulo the possibility of internal sophistication as a distinct means of
articulating the common ontology of these symmetry-related models;25
more on this in §4 below).26
By contrast, in cases in which symmetry-related models are iso-
morphic, Møller-Nielsen does not favour reductionism, but rather (tra-
ditional) sophistication. For example, in the case of solutions of gen-
eral relativity related by a hole diffeomorphism, or of solutions of NGT
set in Newtonian spacetime related by a static shift (i.e., M versus
Mstat) Møller-Nielsen claims that sophisticated substantivalism (as
presented above) affords a perspicuous characterisation of the com-
25But see footnote 24.
26An anonymous referee has questioned whether the move from NGT set in Newtonian
spacetime, to NGT set in Galilean spacetime, is best understood as a case of reduction, or
of internal sophistication. Insofar as one simply excises (‘forgets’) σa from the models of
the former theory, we agree that this move is, in fact, best understood as a case of internal
sophistication. There are, however, significant subtleties here, for in fact (see [50, fn. 9]),
following Pooley [47, §§4.4-4.5], Møller-Nielsen does not favour the formulation of NGT
set in Newtonian spacetime presented above; rather, he makes use of models of this theory
which do not feature the derivative operator ∇ (since, in fact, σa also provides a standard
of straightness of paths), and favours dynamics for the theory written directly in terms
of σa (rather than ∇). In that case, the move from NGT set in Newtonian spacetime to
NGT set in Galilean spacetime also involves modification of the equations of the theory—
i.e., the syntax—in order to arrive at the usual formulation of the laws of the latter theory
(i.e., (2)-(4)), formulated using the derivative operator ∇. Given this, it is arguably best
to understand this change of spacetime setting for NGT, for Møller-Nielsen, as a case of
reduction.
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mon ontology of these models (namely, a characterisation proceeding
on the basis of anti-haecceitism)—no reductionist move proceeding
in terms of e.g. Einstein algebras or Leibniz algebras (respectively—
cf. [21, ch. 9]) is necessary. It is clear, then, that while Møller-Nielsen
embraces traditional sophistication, he rejects external sophistication;
as a consequence, he appeals to reductionism as a means of expli-
cating the ontology of non-isomorphic, symmetry-related models, but
sophisticated substantivalism as a means of explicating the ontology
of isomorphic, symmetry-related models.
What is our purpose in making these observations? The reason for
doing so is the following: the case of Møller-Nielsen illustrates that the
interpretational/motivational distinction is prima facie orthogonal to
the reduction/sophistication distinction—it might be that:
(a) one embraces the interpretational approach simpliciter—remaining
silent on a justification; or
(b) one embraces the interpretational approach alongside reduction—
i.e., the interpretational approach is justified by the promised
guarantee that reduction is universally possible, without having
to actually provide a reduced theory in advance (as Dewar has re-
marked, there are severe problems with this—though see e.g. [11]
for a defence); or
(c) one embraces the interpretational approach alongside sophisti-
cation (as with Dewar)—i.e., the interpretational approach is
justified by the promised guarantee that (external) sophistica-
tion is universally possible, without having to actually provide
the sophisticated theory in advance; or
(d) one embraces the motivational approach alongside reduction—
i.e. only once a reduced theory is provided can the symmetry-
to-(un)reality inference proceed (since Dasgupta rejects sophisti-
cated substantivalism in [12], yet appears to embrace motivation-
alism in [14], arguably this author falls into this category—see
[49, §5.3] for further discussion); or
(e) one embraces the motivational approach alongside sophistication—
i.e., only once a sophisticated version of the theory is provided
can the symmetry-to-(un)reality inference proceed; or
(f) one embraces some more complicated combination of these views.
As we have seen, Møller-Nielsen in fact falls into category (f), for
he invariably endorses the motivational approach to symmetries, yet
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thinks that reduction is appropriate only in some cases (namely, when
the symmetry-related models under consideration are not isomorphic),
whereas otherwise one should embrace (traditional) sophistication.
We stand with Møller-Nielsen—the only differences being that (i) we
do allow super-empirical criteria to block one’s motivation to construct
a reduced/sophisticated version of one’s original theory (cf. §2.3), and
(ii) we do allow that internal sophistication may afford a means of
explicating the common ontology of symmetry-related models.
4 On sophistication
With all of the above in hand, we turn now to the main event: a
critical evaluation of Dewar’s (external) sophistication about symme-
tries. In the following subsections, we present what we take to be some
problems with this approach to articulating the ontology of symmetry-
related models of a given theory. In §4.1, we question the scope of the
examples which Dewar presents in [18] in favour of sophistication—
and argue that these do not provide compelling motivation for univer-
sal external sophistication (and a fortiori not for the interpretational
approach to symmetries). In §4.2, we question the extent to which
sophistication can preserve explanatory power—we argue that this is
not invariably the case. The discussions in these first two subsections
allow us to develop in more detail some general concerns regarding
external sophistication—concerns which we express in §4.3.
4.1 On universality
In [18, §4], several examples of sophistication are presented, before it
is proposed that sophistication—specifically external sophistication—
can be applied universally to articulate the ontology of symmetry-
related models. If these examples were representative, this would go
some way towards rendering plausible the generalisation of the appli-
cability of external sophistication to all cases of symmetries, as well
as illustrating in more detail what is meant by this form of sophistica-
tion. It is, however, unclear whether the examples are truly successful
in this regard.
Dewar’s simplest example is instantaneous electrostatics in terms
of potentials [18, pp. 489, 494]. In this case (for reasons which will
become clear), it will serve to be more explicit than hitherto about
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the structure of the KPMs of this theory. These (in order to fol-
low Dewar’s understanding of the theory) we take to be sextuples
〈M ×R, δij , ab, γ, φa, ρ〉, where δij is a Euclidean metric on the three-
dimensional differentiable manifold M , and φ and ρ represent, respec-
tively, the electrostatic potential and charge density. In addition, we
have included the ‘internal’ manifold R in which φ takes its values,
the Euclidean metric ab on this R, an ‘internal’ scalar field γ which
picks out the origin of this space, and ‘internal’ indices on φ (used
to specify the value of φ in R at a particular p ∈ M). DPMs of this
theory are picked out via the dynamical equation
δij∇i∇jφ = 4piρ. (5)
The semantics of this theory are such that φ takes value in R. Then,
adding any constant κ to any φ that solves this equation generates
a new solution. If we assume that all solutions differing merely by
such a κ-shift are empirically equivalent, then this κ-shift constitutes a
symmetry transformation (of the kind relevant to this paper—cf. §2.2).
Do these symmetry-related models represent the same physical state of
affairs? This question is analogous to the shift arguments in NGT set
on Newtonian spacetime—albeit with an internal, rather than external
(i.e., spacetime) transformation.27
Consider a map ψ : φa 7→ φa + κa on the internal space which
implements a constant shift of the value of φa. Such a map can
be used to generate a new model of this theory, Mshift = 〈M ×
R, δij , ab, γ, ψ∗φa, ρ〉. Since the diffeomorphism acts only on the in-
ternal space, we have δij = ψ∗δij and ψ∗ρ = ρ; moreover, since these
transformations are a symmetry of the Euclidean metric ab on R, we
have ab = ψ∗ab. However, since these transformations shift the ori-
gin on R, as given by γ, we have γ 6= ψ∗γ—meaning that such shifts
of the electrostatic potential φ do not generate isomorphic models.
In this case, as in the kinematic shift, a mere ‘traditional sophistica-
tionist’ metaphysical move (in this case anti-quidditism—see below)
is not sufficient to regard these models as representing the same phys-
27There is a sense in which the case is analogous to the static shift: to φ is added a
constant factor κ. But there is also a sense in which the case is analogous to the kinematic
shift: with γ included in the semantics of this theory, the pre- and post-shift models are not
isomorphic. In fact, the most directly analogous Newtonian shift scenario is of static shifts
in Aristotelian spacetime (which is Newtonian spacetime supplemented with a preferred
point—see e.g. [64, §4] for relevant discussion), in which, for a static shift, the pre- and
post-shift models are again not isomorphic.
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ical state of affairs; rather, one must also mathematically reformulate,
to excise the origin γ of R, and move to a formulation in which φa
is valued in a one-dimensional metric affine space. Only then does
traditional sophistication suffice as a means of regarding the models
as representing the same physical state of affairs.
In the case of substantivalism, this renouncing of a (primitive)
non-qualitative, transworld identity of manifold points (here, points
in R) means renouncing haecceitism; in the case of electrostatics the
manoeuvre goes under the name of anti-quidditism. The idea is that
just as haecceities allow for the primitive identification of objects, such
as spacetime points, across possibilities, so too do quiddities allow for
the primitive identification of property-holdership across possibilities.
It is important to note, though, that while (anti-)quidditism often
(implicitly) refers to determinable properties, such as ‘having mass’
or ‘being charged’, we are here concerned with transworld identifica-
tion of determinate properties, such as ‘having that mass’ or ‘having
a mass of 1kg’.28 What is at stake in our discussion of electrostatics is
not determining whether the counterpart of the electrostatic potential
φ in a κ-shifted world is still an electrostatic potential or instead, say,
a gravitational potential. The issue is whether there is a determinate
magnitude of the electrostatic potential φ in one world—say the mag-
nitude that is represented by φ having the numerical value zero—that
can be identified with a determinate magnitude of the electrostatic
potential φ in another world. In other wor(l)ds, is there a matter of
fact about determinate magnitudes of the electrostatic potential, or
only about differences in magnitudes? To sum up: anti-quidditism
(about determinate properties) denies the existence of quidditistic
facts about the (determinate) properties in our theories. Given this
thesis, no meaningful sense can be made of κ-shifted φ as fields rep-
resenting distinct possibilities. Terminology aside, however, both the
anti-haecceitist and anti-quidditist strategies are clearly forms of tradi-
tional sophistication—for they identify distinct but isomorphic models
of our physical theories.
So: on Dewar’s understanding of the electrostatics case, κ-shifted
models are not isomorphic, but one can (in our reconstruction) im-
plement the internal sophisticationist strategy by (a) modifying the
semantics of the theory in order to excise γ from its models, and (b)
28Or, more correctly, ‘having the mass that is in our world represented by the numerical
quantity 1kg’. One should be careful not to misinterpret [18, pp. 504-505] as suggesting
that it is determinable rather than determinate properties which are relevant here.
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interpreting the points in R anti-quidditistically. It is worth noting
here, however, that there is another understanding of electrostatics—
different from Dewar’s—in which the origin γ is not included in the
semantics, and transworld comparison of (field values at) points in R
is facilitated entirely by a quidditistic understanding of the points in
that manifold; in that case (just as in the static shift in NGT), no
mathematical reformulation is necessary in order to understand these
models as representing the same physical state of affairs; rather, an
anti-quidditist metaphysical move suffices. (Indeed, there is a sense in
which including the origin γ of R is unnatural, as one must then make
two conceptually similar philosophical moves in order to regard mod-
els of electrostatics differing at most by κ-shifted φ as being physically
equivalent; for this reason, a version of the theory without inclusion
of γ is our preferred initial formulation of the theory.) In either case,
though, it should be clear that what Dewar has illustrated here is
an instance of internal sophistication (whether involving (a) both se-
mantic reformulation and traditional sophistication, as on the former
version of the theory, or (b) just traditional sophistication, as on the
latter); the example provides no positive illustration of how external
sophistication is supposed to work. Indeed, this is especially so as
this particular example merely excises structure naturally associated
with quidditistic differences: it remains unclear, absent further de-
tails, how the sophisticationist strategy is supposed to work in more
complex cases of symmetries.
One can understand Dewar’s second example—of full-blown elec-
tromagnetism, in its vector potential formulation—as being intended
to address this concern. KPMs of this theory (eschewing an explicit
presentation of the ‘internal’ machinery, which we included in the pre-
vious example) are quadruples 〈M,ηab, Aa, Ja〉, where ηab is a fixed
Minkowski metric field on the four-dimensional differentiable mani-
fold M , Aa is a four-vector encoding Maxwell fields, and Ja is a source






where ∇ is the derivative operator compatible with ηab. It is very
well-known that (6) is invariant under electromagnetic ‘gauge trans-
formations’ of the form
Aa 7→ Aa −∇aΛ, (7)
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for some scalar function Λ; moreover, models of electromagnetism re-
lated by such gauge transformations are typically taken to be empiri-
cally equivalent. In this case (as in Dewar’s understanding of electro-
statics), models related by (7) are not isomorphic: the transformation
under consideration is the analogue of the Leibnizian kinematic shift,
rather than the static shift. So: how does Dewar’s sophisticationist
strategy proceed in the context of this theory?
As before, in this case, Dewar does more than merely declare that
these symmetry-related models may be treated as being isomorphic, as
per the external sophisticationist agenda. In addition, Dewar math-
ematically reformulates the theory, such that the correlates of the
symmetry-related models in the original version of electromagnetism
are indeed isomorphic in the reformulated theory. In this case, De-
war proposes that recourse to the machinery of fibre bundles is the
appropriate strategy:
Finally, consider the electromagnetic theory. This time,
models of the theory are to be connections on a principal
U (1)-bundle over R4. [Footnote suppressed.] Once more,
we retain [(6)], but now interpreted in a way that makes
use only of the more minimalist structure available in the
models: [Aa] is now interpreted as the vector potential of
the target connection relative to some arbitrarily chosen
flat connection on the principal bundle. [18, p. 501]
Note that here, Dewar is explicitly presenting a different (more im-
poverished) mathematical formalism for electromagnetism—that is, a
different space of kinematic (a fortiori dynamic) possibilities. In this
new formalism, solutions of the theory related by (7) are isomorphic—
so that one may (finally—as in the previous example) apply traditional
sophistication in order to regard all such models as representing the
same physical state of affairs.29
We have absolutely no qualms about this overall (internal sophisti-
cationist) strategy (beyond issues raised in §4.2) as affording, at least
prima facie, a novel tool for articulating the ontology of symmetry-
related models, compared to reduction. However, it is important to
note that the mathematical reformulation here—just as in the case
of reduction when faced with non-isomorphic models—was essential
to the project: external sophistication of the theory under considera-
29See [63] for a clarification that, in this case, neither reduction nor internal sophistica-
tion yields a theory with surplus structure.
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tion was insufficient to do this, absent carrying through the project of
also mathematically reformulating the theory under consideration—
that is, absent the project (just as in the case of reduction) of finding
a new formalism via which models of the original theory may ulti-
mately be interpreted. Given that, in general, it may be very difficult
to identify what the appropriate mathematical reformulation is sup-
posed to consist in (a fact which Dewar also acknowledges: “it is often
very opaque what kind of internal construction will correspond to an
external construction.” [16, p. 503]), in our view, the external so-
phisticationist strategy is insufficient as a means of articulating the
ontology of symmetry-related models. Moreover, this difficulty high-
lights that in this case there was no guarantee that such a formulation
was even possible, and a fortiori there is no universal generalisation
of such a guarantee for all symmetries in all theories. Sometimes one
first needs to explicitly perform non-trivial mathematical feats, such
as moving to the fibre bundle formalism of electromagnetism. With-
out such a universal guarantee, this otherwise-promising strategy of
internal sophistication is most naturally paired with motivationalism
(i.e. options (e) or (f) in §3.2), instead of providing a justification of
interpretationalism (option (c)).30
Finally, consider the third example presented by Dewar, which is
posed in the language of first-order predicate logic. ‘Kinematically’,
the objects of this theory are two predicates, L and R; ‘dynamically’,
the following two sentences are satisfied:
∀x(Lx ∨Rx), (8)
∀x¬(Lx ∧Rx). (9)
It is true that if we have a solution to this theory, swapping all L and
R predicates—that is, predicating (only) L of all objects originally
instantiating R and vice versa—takes a solution to another solution,
i.e. preserves the ‘dynamics’. What is not the case is that this suffices
to call such a swap a ‘symmetry’ in the relevant sense (cf. §2.2), de-
spite Dewar’s claim to the contrary [18, p. 488]. Without any further
context, the predicates L and R could be anything—and so it need not
be the case that the models related by the L/R-switch are empirically
equivalent, which, as we have seen, is the sense of ‘symmetry trans-
formation’ relevant to these considerations. (To take an example, let
R stand for ‘being a rhinoceros’ and L stand for ‘being a leopard’. A
30We are grateful to Caspar Jacobs for discussion on the contents of this paragraph.
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world with one rhino and six leopards is not empirically equivalent to
a world with one leopard and six rhinos!) In any case, let us restrict to
the empirically equivalent L/R-swaps, as seems to be what Dewar has
in mind when he makes the suggestion—which he presents as a mere
heuristic whilst it thus actually does a lot of work—that we think of L
and R as referring to the ‘left-handedness’ and ‘right-handedness’ of
gloves [18, p. 487]. (Here we should presumably further assume parity
conservation, as would be true of gloves governed by, say, NGT.) As
in the electrostatics case, Dewar proposes that sophistication in this
case can proceed via the rejection of quiddities [18, pp. 498-499].31 Ac-
cording to such anti-quiddittism about determinate handedness, there
is no way of identifying the handedness of gloves across worlds; they
are after all (at least intrinsically) qualitatively identical (pace Van
Cleve [58]32), since the shape and size of all the components and the
angles between them are identical between gloves. In other words,
there is no absolute, primitive sense in which a glove is ‘left-handed’
beyond it being enantiomorphically related to what we conventionally
call, in that same world, a ‘right-handed’ glove (i.e., there is no prim-
itive, non-qualitative, non-conventional determinate property of ‘be-
31Is quidditism about determinate handedness conceivable and metaphysically possible
in the first place? If not, there would be no reason to praise Dewar’s proposal for revealing
such quiddities to be redundant and for getting rid of them. Perhaps Earman’s primitive
internal relations ‘standing in a left-configuration’ and ‘standing in a right-configuration’
could be interpreted as providing such quiddities [20] (see also [58]), and/or his primitive
intrinsic properties R∗ and L∗ [21, §7.3]. Another example would be Walker’s primitive ori-
entations [61]. However, in following this tradition, Dewar ignores that it has been realised
long ago (pace [20, pp. 133-4]) that ‘left-handedness’ is not and could not be a primitive,
non-qualitative, non-conventional property which allows us to compare handedness across
worlds [23, 24, 30, 42, 59]. One way of seeing this is that, if space is non-orientable, a
left-handed glove and a right-handed glove could be made congruent. Even if space is ori-
entable, a rotation in the fourth dimension would equally turn a supposedly left-handed
glove into a right-handed one. Primitive non-qualitative properties should not depend
on mere rigid transportations within a single possible world of the objects instantiating
those quiddities. Baptising one glove as ‘left-handed’—and thereby also all others that
are congruent with it—is a mere linguistic convention that has no metaphysical bite, es-
pecially not in other worlds than the one in which the baptism occurred. (Moreover, if,
per impossibile, these supposed quiddities were part of the essence of being left-handed, it
would have been hard to see how we could have decided to ‘just’ forget about them.) In
other words, gloves are born (traditionally) sophisticated, despite the misleading notation
of (8) and (9). No notion of sophistication at all plays a role in this example, let alone
external sophistication.
32See also [27, 32].
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ing left-handed’ to be instantiated beyond such a pair of incongruent
gloves each instantiating the determinable, qualitative property ‘being
handed’ as well as the determinate, qualitative property ‘standing in
the opposite configuration as the other glove’.) If this is what Dewar
proposes, though, then this analysis is clearly once again (at best33)
an instance of traditional sophistication—non-qualitative distinctions
between isomorphic worlds are simply ‘forgotten’.
If Dewar’s examples were illustrative, representative instances of
external sophistication, then this would go some way towards sup-
porting the proposal that symmetry-related models may invariably be
externally sophisticated, thereby in turn supporting the interpreta-
tional approach. Instead, however, we have seen that Dewar’s exam-
ples provide no motivation at all for external sophistication: either
they are merely cases of traditional sophistication, or they explicitly
appeal to mathematical reformulation (and so internal sophistication),
which is a strategy more naturally paired with motivationalism than
with interpretationalism. Of course, none of this proves that there
could be no illustrative examples of external sophistication, nor does
it provide any argument against external sophistication. Discussion
of these more directly critical matters is deferred to §4.3.
4.2 On explanation
As discussed in §3.1, Dewar acknowledges the importance of retaining
explanatory power in the context of symmetry-to-(un)reality infer-
ences. In fact, we are in agreement that it is a problematic feature of
some reduced theories that they exhibit explanatory deficits relative
to the original theories from which they are derived [18, 35]. Consider,
for instance, the reduced theory corresponding to the above example
of electrostatics, where the invariant mathematical structure is the
electric field Ei := ∇iφ. In order to capture the full content of the
original theory, it is not sufficient to substitute this definition of the
electric field into (5), to obtain
δij∇iEj = 4piρ; (10)
rather, one also needs to add the condition
ijk∇jEk = 0. (11)
33See footnote 31.
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In the original theory, however, the equivalent expression is a mathe-
matical identity:
ijk∇j∇kφ = 0. (12)
Thus, in our original formulation of electrostatics, equation (12)
is an “analytic or definitional necessity rather than a “mere” law”
[18, p. 497]—as it is in the case of equation (11) in our ‘reduced’
formulation of electrostatics. Dewar correctly points out that such a
definition counts as a proper explanation on many popular accounts
of explanation in philosophy of science; an explanation that is lack-
ing in the reduced theory. The question to be considered now, then,
is whether (externally) sophisticated theories invariably preserve ex-
planatory virtues as compared with the unsophisticated theories from
which they are constructed.
Dewar’s motivation for seemingly promising as much stems from
the fact that sophistication does not change the equations of a given
theory—it modifies only the semantics, while leaving the syntax un-
touched. In the case study of electrostatics from §4.1, for example,
sophistication merely replaces R by a one-dimensional, oriented, met-
ric affine space as the range of φ. This leaves ∇iφ well-defined and
invariant, such that equations (5) and (12) also still hold and remain
well-defined, thereby preserving explanatory power. The natural ques-
tion to ask at this point is, then, the following: can explanatory power
arise only from the dynamical equations of a given theory? In this
subsection, we give a negative answer to this question. Explanatory
power may be preserved in examples such as electrostatics—but (we
contend) such examples are again unrepresentative.
Our first problem case for the claim that sophisticated theories
invariably preserve explanatory power can be illustrated by consid-
ering NGT set on Newtonian spacetime. Within this theory, abso-
lute velocities are not “idly turning wheels” [41, p. 1263], but are
used to define the observable relative velocities. Following Dewar’s
earlier claim about definitions, this should count as a proper expla-
nation: absolute velocities ‘indirectly’ explain observable phenomena
by defining/explaining relative velocities which are observable. It is
then somewhat surprising that Dewar does not promise or show that
the explanatory power will not decrease when such symmetry-related
models are (externally) sophisticated, but instead denies that these
putative explanations are truly indispensable [16, p. 322].
A second problem case for the claim that sophisticated theories
invariably preserve explanatory power is also drawn from Newtonian
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gravitation. Consider force-based Newtonian gravitation, in terms of
the standard set of initial variables and parameters, i.e. distance r,
velocity v, and mass m. For simplicity, focus on models with two
equally massive particles with zero total angular momentum. One







If the initial relative velocity v0 := v (t = 0) of the particles is larger
than ve, they will end up escaping each other; otherwise, they will
end up colliding. Two sets of initial conditions agreeing on their mass
ratios can nevertheless be distinct if these ratios hold in virtue of
distinct quidditistic absolute masses. Can these absolute masses make
a difference? They can. The following transformation will, for an






These non-qualitative mappings of initial states lead to empirically
distinguishable evolutions—escape versus non-escape. (This transfor-
mation is thus not a symmetry [33, 37, 36]—pace Dasgupta [13]). Al-
though this does not make absolute masses detectable in the same
sense as relative velocities, it does make them detectable in some
weaker sense, that still makes them more empirically relevant than,
say, absolute velocities [37]. Quidditistic absolute masses may thus
explain detectable phenomena.
One may retort that since transformation (14) is not a symmetry,
it has no relevance to the current project concerning symmetry-to-
(un)reality inferences. In response to this concern, we proceed now by
considering another theory for which transformation (14) is a symme-
try, but in which absolute masses nevertheless play an indispensable
explanatory role.
Consider the following Newtonian theory (see [36] for further dis-
cussion of this theory). (Although this theory is of course related
to standard Newtonian gravity—both theories are in fact empirically
equivalent—it is syntactically distinct from standard Newtonian grav-
ity; here we will consider this theory on its own.) The gravitational
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—thereby rendering transformation (14) a symmetry (in the relevant
sense—cf. §2.2) of this theory; uniform mass scalings do not lead to
an empirical difference. Note, moreover, that this symmetry relates
qualitatively indistinguishable models.
There is some ambiguity as to how one should proceed with so-
phisticating this theory, as there are at least two options available
for ‘forgetting structure’ (without modifying the syntax).34 The most
obvious option is to throw away absolute masses altogether. It was
for this exact reason—obtaining an ontology with no absolute masses
but only mass ratios mij (i.e., primitive and symmetric relations of
‘comparative masshood’ holding between particles i and j)—that this
theory was designed in the first place [36]. However, if the funda-
mental ontology in this theory consists only of mass relations, there is
nothing to ensure the transitivity of those mass relations,
mij = mik ·mkj , for any three particles i, j, k. (17)
To make matters worse, without such a transitivity constraint holding,
one could not even coherently interpret these mass relations as ratios
in the first place [36]. Only if one commits to absolute masses in
virtue of which the mass ratios hold does one explain the transitivity
of those mass relations, as the following becomes a mathematical truth








for any three particles i, j, k. (18)
34Note that we think of absolute masses and mass relations/ratios in the sense defined
by Martens [37, §3], not in terms of property spaces.
32
Recall that Dewar agrees that this constitutes an explanation. Thus,
in this theory, absolute masses may not be invariant under the sym-
metry transformation (14), but they are nevertheless explanatorily
indispensable: they ensure transitivity of mass ratios as a matter of
mathematical fact. It is hard to see how any other ontology could
dispense with absolute masses whilst retaining this explanation.
This pushes one towards the second option for sophisticating this
theory: retain the absolute masses but ‘forget’ just their quiddities.
(As with the previous option, the syntax is not modified.) As Jacobs
argues, this suffices to explain the transitivity of mass relations [29].
This therefore seems the best option for a weak interpretationalist. It
should be noted though, once more, that the original motivation for in-
troducing (15) was to dispose of absolute masses in virtue of which the
mass ratios obtain.35 It goes against the spirit of interpretationalism
to retain more than what is invariant under the symmetry. Moreover,
this confirms once again that explanatory considerations—mass ratios
obtain in virtue of, i.e. are metaphysically explained by, underlying ab-
solute masses (albeit non-quidditistic ones)—that go beyond syntax
and dynamical equations can play a crucial role in determining the
metaphysical consequences of symmetries. Furthermore, even if this
option is indeed the best of both options, the fact remains that a non-
trivial choice between two options had to be made. The whole point
of external sophistication and of interpretationalism is that one is sup-
posed to be able to draw immediate metaphysical consequences from
the symmetries of a theory. The fact that we needed to do some work
(cf. our discussion of gauge transformations within electromagnetism
in §4.1), that we needed to make non-trivial decisions before the ap-
propriate ontology was revealed, resonates more with motivationalism
than interpretationalism.
Let us finally and briefly return to another problematic symmetry:
that of gauge shifts of the electromagnetic vector potential (§4.1),
but specifically in the context of the Aharonov-Bohm effect [1]. This
context has been discussed frequently and in detail in the literature—
e.g. [18, 26, 35]—so we will not dwell on it here. Suffice it to say that,
although we agree that the sophisticated theory can recover analogues
of (12) and (17), to the extent that this counts as an explanation it
is not an explanation that is, in all relevant senses, separable (pace
[29]), as Dewar acknowledges [18, fn. 56]. At the same time, there is
35This view goes under the name of comparativism, i.e. the denial of absolutism, about
mass [13, 37].
33
a reduced theory available that is local in all relevant senses [62].36
To sum up: the promise of universal external sophistication that
explanatory powers will invariably be preserved is motivated by the
fact that such sophistication leaves the dynamical equations untouched.
We agree that this ensures that explanations provided by those dy-
namical equations are preserved, and we have seen that this consti-
tutes an improvement upon reductionism for some cases. However,
this motivation remains silent on other types of explanation (as well
as on other super-empirical criteria). Dewar has thus not provided a
universal argument for explanatory power being preserved after so-
phistication. The examples in this subsection indicate that there can-
not be such argument, as sophistication fails to invariably preserve
explanations that do not derive from the dynamical equations. On
both the weak interpretational approach and the strong motivational
approach to symmetry-to-(un)reality inferences, loss of such explana-
tory power may then be considered as a reason for blocking these
inferences, even when these approaches are (partially) combined with
(traditional or external) sophistication.
4.3 On sophistry
If the examples presented by Dewar in [18], discussed in §4.1, do not
support his proposal for the universal application of external sophis-
tication, might there be independent positive reasons for believing in
this proposal, as there are for the restricted application of sophistica-
tion (i.e., the traditional notion)? Or (weaker still), can any transpar-
ent examples of external sophistication of non-isomorphic symmetry-
related models be given?
We are sceptical. To stipulate that qualitatively distinct, i.e. non-
isomorphic models, such as models of NGT related by kinematic shifts,
are nevertheless isomorphic reads prima facie as nothing more than
a flat-out contradiction.37 The burden falls on the advocate of exter-
36For further discussion of these issues in the context of the debates which are the focus
of this paper, see [35].
37Perhaps Dewar has in mind a decoupling of the notions of ‘qualitatively identical’ and
‘isomorphic’, with kinematic shifts producing models that are not qualitatively identical
but nevertheless isomorphic. But what could this concept of isomorphism be? ‘Identical
in structure up to empirically indistuinguishable structure’? That would amount to ver-
ificationism, a label that Dewar resists [16, p. 320] (and for good reason, as his proposal
would thereby fail to connect to the realist project that both the interpretational and
motivational approaches purport to be involved in—more on this below). As a general
34
nal sophistication to explicate what (s)he has in mind here—for to
simply insist that all symmetry-related models be regarded as being
isomorphic simply appears to be begging the interpretative question—
of Russellian theft over honest toil [55, p. 71].
We submit that Dewar is seeking to have his cake and eat it. He
cannot. One natural worry to have about the external sophistication-
ist programme is that it is not (fully) realist in spirit to begin with.38
As is evident from §3.1, Dewar suggests that one can be a realist (sim-
pliciter) without having to make any commitments as to which parts
of a theory one is realist or anti-realist about—that is, without hav-
ing to commit to realism about anything specific. This is certainly
consonant with external sophistication—but in that case, it is often
opaque what reality is being subscribed to; moreover, it is often un-
clear what grounds or explains or justifies the physical equivalence of
models that, on a natural interpretation, represent distinct possible
worlds [41]. Dewar concedes as much when he states that it is “often
very opaque” [18, p. 503] what kind of semantics (if any!) corresponds
to this stipulation that symmetry-related models should be considered
‘as if’ they are isomorphic. We confess, in line with Møller-Nielsen [41]
and Sider [57, §5], that we find it difficult to make sense of such an
opaque realism.
In this context, it is helpful to emphasise the following belief which
we do share with Dewar:
if we want to know the answers to specific questions about
the nature of a theory’s ontology and ideology, then [a re-
formulated theory] is invaluable. [16, p.326]
We take it that a complete and honest form of realism should not only
take these questions—such as the question of which parts of a theory
one is to be realist about and which parts one is not—on board, but
consider them to be crucial. Leaving them out is at best a dishon-
est form of realism, and at worst a form of anti-realism. Treating
qualitatively distinct models related by a symmetry ‘as if’ they are
isomorphic does not help one do the hard interpretative work that is
point: we take it that one reason to favour traditional sophistication or reduction over
external sophistication is that the former two interpretative strategies are less prone to
collapse into verificationism—we thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing us on this.
38Note that this objection against taking sophistication to be a realist-approved
stratagem is distinct from other such objections towards the same conclusion which have




Dewar’s work on the philosophy of symmetries has precipitated signif-
icant advances in the field; moreover, the concept of internal sophisti-
cation is an important new tool which can (and should) be deployed
in consideration of symmetry-to-reality inferences. This notwithstand-
ing, however, we are sceptical of the notion of external sophistication—
which, to our minds, does not attain a sufficiently high level of meta-
physical perspicuity in order to constitute a means of explicating the
ontology of symmetry-related models of a given theory. In [18], De-
war has motivated only traditional sophistication (which is already
known to be a viable metaphysical thesis) and internal sophistication
(which involves more than merely forgetting structure, as it also re-
quires mathematical reformulation); he has not motivated external
sophistication. Finally, while it is true that sophistication (insofar as
the proposal makes sense) can preserve the explanatory merits of the
original theory under consideration (whereas a reduced theory will of-
ten lack those merits), we have seen in this paper reasons to doubt that
sophistication invariably preserves explanatory qualities. Our conclu-
sions are, therefore, threefold: (a) as a thesis purporting to shed light
on the ontology of symmetry-related models, external sophistication
about symmetries is lacking; (b) one must be cautious when it comes
to making claims about the explanatory merits of sophisticated the-
ories; and (c) the proposal of universal external sophistication, as it
stands, thereby a fortiori fails to prove that it can provide the support
that the interpretational approach to symmetries requires.
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